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ALFRED W. v. SELMA P. E. 
Animals-Liability for Injuries by Dogs-Defenses.-In 
the owner of a liable 
tion of risk 
available in all proper cases. 
[2] Negligence--Assumption of Risk-Elements.-The elements of 
the defense of of risk are a and 
involved and his voluntary accept-
[3] Animals-Liability for Injuries by Dogs-Assumption of Risk. 
-If a salesman outside a fence with a closed gate recognized 
the danger that a barking dog inside the fence would bite him 
if he entered, his knowledge was sufficient to assume the risk 
of being bitten should he expose himself to the danger, al-
though he did not know whether the had a history of 
viciousness. 
[4] Negligence-Assumption of Risk-Knowledge of Danger.-
Assuming that the defense of assumption of risk is not avail-
able unhlss plaintiff had actual knowledge, as distinguished 
from constructive notice, of the risk, actual lmov;ledge of the 
risk may be inferred from the circumstances. 
[5] Animals-Liability for Injuries by Dogs-Evidence.-In an 
action under the Dog Bite Statute § 3342) for in-
juries sustained by a salesman w}wn bitten defendant's dog, 
a finding that plaintiff assumed the risk of being bitten was 
sustained by evidence the display 
of inside a wire plaintiff 
elected to leave his sidewalk 
outside the fence and on defendant's enclosed prop-
erty, since in so himself to the 
obvious hazard. 




McK. Dig. References: 
§ 32. 
§ 57 et seq.; Am.Jur., Animals, 
§ 216; Am.Jur., 
[1, 3, 5] Animals, §57; [2, 4] Negligence, 
Jan. GOMES v. BYRNE 
[51 C.2d 418; 333 P.2d 754] 
419 





for from a 
for defendant affirmed. 
Barceloux 
and Jordan l.VI. Peckham 
D. :M:cKalson 
,J.-Plaintiff under the so-called 
Dog Bite Statute ( Civ. Code, § 3342) for injuries inflicted by 
defendant's Pollowing a trial without a ;jury, judgment 
was entered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals from said judg-
ment and from the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
'l'he latter order is not appealable and therefore the purported 
therefrom must be dismissed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) 
Defendant is a praetieal nurse and uses her premises as a 
private nursing home. At the time of the occurrence, the house 
and yard were surrounded by a wire fence with a closed gate. 
A led from the gate to the front door. No signs were 
on the premises indicating that or solicitors 
were unwelcome, nor was there any sign of a vicious 
a salesman for the Fuller Brush Company, was 
canvassing in the neighborhood of defendant's home. As he 
walked along the sidewalk approaching the gate leading to 
defendant's door, the dog in the enclosed followed him 
along the inside of the fence for about 50 feet, barking con-
tinuously all the way. Plaintiff nevertheless the gate 
and walked into the the dog bit him on the 
right lower a puncture wound and superficial 
abrasions. heard the went to 
the door and met as he came up the Plaintiff 
said that had bitten him; defendant expressed her 
sorrow at the ; and plaintiff responded with the state-
ment that it was one of "the hazards of the game." Plaintiff 
gave defendant a and left. rrhe next day plaintiff 
again called at defendant's home and at that time defendant 
bought some merchandise from him. 
420 GoMES v. BYRNE [51 0.2d 
Section 3342 of the Civil Code : ''The owner of any 
is liable for the suffered any person who is 
while iu a public place or lawfully in a pri-
the property of the owner of the dog, 
of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's 
such viciousness. A person is lawfully upon the 
property of such owner within the of this 
section when he is on . . . upon the invitation, 
express or 
The trial court 
that (1) 
of the owner.'' 
denial of recovery was based upon findings 
was not a business visitor or invitee on the 
that plaintiff was negligent in entering defend-
ant's and ) that plaintiff assumed the risk. Since 
we have concluded that the record sustains the finding that 
plaintiff assumed the risk, it is unnecessary to consider his 
contention that he was lawfully on the premises or his further 
contention that contributory negligence is not a bar to re-
covery under the Dog Bite Statute. 
[1] In adopting section 3342 of the Civil Code, the Legis-
lature did not intend to render inapplicable such defenses as 
assumption of risk or wilfully invited injury. Therefore those 
defenses are available in all proper cases. (See Smythe v. 
Schacht, 93 Cal.App.2d 315, 321 [209 P.2d 114] ; see also 2 
Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 14.12, pp. 
843-845.) 
Plaintiff contends that the defense of assumption of risk 
is not available here because there was no showing that the 
dog had a history of viciousness or that plaintiff knew of 
that history. He argues that the knowledge required of a 
plaintiff before he can be held to have assumed the risk is 
identical to that which had been required to impose liability 
on the owner of the dog prior to the enactment of section 3342 
of the Civil Code. We have concluded that plaintiff's position 
cannot be sustained. 
[2] The ''elements of the defense of assumption of risk 
arc a person's knowledge and appreciation of the danger in-
volved and his voluntary acceptance of the risk." (Prescott 
v. Ralphs Co., 42 Ca1.2d 158, 162 [265 P.2d 904] ; 
emphasis added.) [3] Thus if plaintiff recognized the 
danger that the dog would bite him, his knowledge was suffi-
cient he did not know whether the dog had a history 
of viciousness. 
[4] Plaintiff claims, however, that there was no showing 
Jan. 
that had aetua l 
as:mmcd for ihe purpose of tlli;; f1iscusRion that the defense 
of assumption of risk is not available unless the intiff had 
actual as from construeiivP 
of thr ri"k wpm, 42 
Cal.2d 1 ]62; Slobodcn Y. 
557, 562 [281 P.2d ] ; :);-) CaL.Jm § 277, p. 
828; Comment, 10 So. Cal. h Hev. 67. 74.) Bnt actual knowl-
edge of the rjE!k mav be inferred from the eireumstanees. 
(Chino Yee v. Dy 148 138-130 [299 
P.2d 668] .) 
[5] Here the dog had follmYcd plaintiff 
for 50 feet' all the way. r nder these 
the risk was obvious. Notwithstand the dog's display of 
hostility, plaintiff P]rded to leave his of upon 
the ]mblir: sidewalk and to enter npon defemlant 's en dosed 
private property. In so ooing, he voluntarily himself 
to the obvious hazard. It was a caleulated risk on plaintiff's 
part, or, as he expressed it, one of the "hazards of the game." 
We therefore eon elude that the trial court's finding that plain-
tiff assumed that risk is amply supported by the evidence. 
The purported appeal from the order denying a new trial 
is dismissed, and the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., eoncurred. 
CAHTER, J.-T dissent. 
I find nothing in the reeord to support the trial court's 
finding that the plaintiff assumed the risk. As the majority 
eorreetly points out, one of the clements of tl1e defense of 
assumption of risk is knowledge of the danger ill volvcd. This 
clement is dearly absent in this case. 
The majority has held that "the risk was obvious." The 
sole predicate for its position is that "the dog had followed 
plaintiff along the fenee for 50 feet, barking all the way." 
To hold that this single piece of evidence is sufficient to show 
that the plaintiff had knowledge of the is umcalistie 
and erroneous. 
One does not have to be an expert on dogs to know that a 
dog that barks is not neeessarily vieious or dangerous. vVhen 
a dog barks and runs alongside of a passer-by, more often than 
not it is only being playful and seeking attention. Aetion of 
this sort by a dog, barring other eircumstances, is not a suffi-




'l'hc record is devoid of evidence 
was negligent in any 1vay. IImYever, 
evidence, it appears that 
lS 
erroneous. 
that the plaintiff 
even if there was such 
not a defense io liability nnder Civil section 8342. 
93 813, 322 [209 P.2d 114].) 
HL""'";.; that the trial ioOurt made a basis for denial 
of recovery was that the plaintiff was not a business visitor or 
invitee on the 'l'his also appears to he incorrect. 
Salesmen are considered invitees when come to a place 
which have good reason to believe is open for possible 
dealings vdth them. Law of Torts, p. 457.) In this 
case the plaintiff was which he could reason-
ably believe ~would be useful and in which 
she would he interested. J\Ioreove1·, defendant had not posted 
signs that peddlers and salesmen were unwdcome. 
In light of these the was justified in believing 
that defendant's were open to him. ''Every man, 
by implication invites others to come to his house as they may 
have proper oceasion either of business or or informa-
tion, etc." (Duval v. Rowell, 124 Cal.App.2d Snpp. 897, 901 
[269 P.2d 249] ; DeLay v. Braun, 63 Cal.App.2d 8, 10 [146 
P.2d 32]; Cambou v. Marty, 98 Cal.App. 601 [277 P. 
365] .) It seems c1ear that the plaintiff was lawfully on the 
defendant's 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
